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Abstract 
In this paper, researcher tends to discuss the “internal control protects shareholders from agency 
problem”. The term of insider ownership refer to the shareholders who manage the company as well. In 
other words, the managers are also the owner of the company. Hence, the conflict of interest between 
the shareholders and managers will reduce as the higher on concentration insider ownership. In this 
study, insider ownership expressed as the percentage of the firm’s outstanding share held by the insider. 
Insider ownership can be classified into outstanding share held by directors, director’s family members 
(e.g., spouse and siblings), board members and employees’ share option scheme committees. Family or 
insider groups as a significant shareholder is more likely to be interested in control benefit as well as 
profit and decision making (Teall, 2007). Small firms usually are higher in insider ownership than 
outsider control. When a firm expands the business through public listing, the ownership will distribute 
ownership opportunity to the public. In Malaysia, when go to public listing, the 30% shares must hold 
by bumiputra. If there are non-bumiputra companies, the companies will gather 30% shares from 
outsiders who are bumiputra to meet the listing requirement. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background of the Study  
The research studies the effect of insider control on the capital structure. In this study, we investigate 
the relationship between the levels of concentration of the insider ownership and the capital structure 
decision of Malaysian main board listed companies. 
Capital structure decision is one of the core determinants of firm value. It refers to the way of a firm 
rises their funds through some combinations of debt, equity or hybrid securities. This financing 
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decision is called capital structure decision. If there is improper way to make capital structure decision, 
it will lead to agency cost, bankruptcy cost and asymmetric information. Therefore, capital structure 
decision is important to affect firm value. 
The problems of corporate governance in transition and developing countries are usually the conflict of 
interest between the shareholders (principal) and agents (manager). This is called agency theory. An 
agency relationship arises whenever one or more individuals, called agents, to perform some service 
and then delegate the authority to agents for decision-making (Kleiman, 2006). The managers may 
have personal goal rather than maximize shareholder’s wealth. They may not really act on behalf of the 
shareholders. This problem will cause to serious moral hazard problem. The agency cost would 
decrease the firm value. To ensure the interest of manager act in the favour of shareholders, the 
managers will be received the stocks and become shareholder as well. This will reduce separation of 
ownership control. 
Ownership structure is a determinant for capital structure decision. A firm with higher insider 
ownership and higher outsider ownership would have different prospect to make capital structure 
decision. Another factor that affects capital structure is the firm size. Small firms would have more 
potential to grow compare to large firms. They are more willing to accept higher risk level than large 
firms. Therefore, firm size will also affect to the capital structure. The last factor that we will study is 
industry sector effect. A given industry will have similar leverage ratios while leverage ratios will vary 
across industries. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In Huang and Song (2006) study, they had presented a series of determinants of capital structure, i.e., 
profitability, tangibility, tax, size, growth opportunities, volatility, and ownership structure. They 
examine all this factors in a developing country—China. Similarly, in our study we will look at the 
capital structure in Malaysia scenario, which is also a developing country with a debt to equity ratio 
slightly higher than Malaysia. However, further in depth study has to be conducted due to there are 
many different results from various researchers that study the insider ownership and capital structure 
relationship in different country.  
Researchers such as Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (1999) found that there is curvilinear relationship 
between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. In Wansley, Collins and Dutta (1996) 
research stated that there is nonlinear relationship between insider shareholdings and leverage. Besides 
that, Tse and Jia (2007) argued that insider shareholdings and major shareholdings on debt level are 
varied and depends on the level of leverage in their research.  
According to Phani, Reddy, Ramachandran and Bhattacharyya (2002) had found that there is positive 
relationship between insider ownership and D/E ratios in the firm with insider ownership greater or 
equal to 51% and vice versa. Other researchers such as Driffield, Mahambare and Pal (2005), and Pant, 
Manoj, Pattanayak and Manoranjan (2007) also proved the positive relationship between insider 
ownership and leverage. In contrast, Garcia and Olvera (2004) have argued that there is negative 
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relationship between insider ownership and debt level. In addition, Huang and Song (2006) has found 
no relationship between insider ownership and capital structure in their study. There are many different 
views and theories found by researchers regarding the relationship between insider ownership and 
capital structure. However, such research towards Malaysia’s firm is very rare. It would be a 
challenging task to investigate how is the relationship between insider ownership and capital structure 
of the firms in Malaysia with regards of the firm size and the industry of the firm. 
1.3 Research Question 
1) Does insider ownership affect capital structure decision? 
2) Does firm size influence the relationship between insider ownership and capital structure? 
3) Does sector in which firms operate influence the relationship between insider ownership and capital 
structure? 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
Our main objective of conduct this research is to examine how insider ownership affects the capital 
structure of the company, which we will examine the relationship by analyse the Main Board public 
listed companies in Bursa Malaysia. Besides that, our specific objectives of the study is to investigate 
whether insider ownership affect capital structure decision differently in different sectors or different 
firm size categories. This study also aims to determine the distribution of insider control and capital 
structure in various sectors and firm size categories. 
1.5 Significant of the Study 
We study the effects of insider ownership on capital structure. Capital structure decision is important 
for managers and shareholders. However, the degree of insider ownership can imply the agency cost of 
the companies which will result the different capital structure decision. According to Braisford, Oliver 
and Pua (1999), the distribution of ownership among different groups can impact on managerial 
opportunism which subsequently can influence the managerial behaviour and corporate governance. 
Therefore, this study will benefit to the managers and shareholders in Malaysia in order understand the 
effect of insider ownership on capital structure decision. 
 
2. Literature Review 
According to Teall (2007) and Kleiman (2006), the agency problem arises when managers face a 
conflict of interest; their own personal objectives do not align with those of the shareholders whom 
they present. The managers who prefer cash compensation may require substantially more value in 
stock or other incentives in order to forego salary in favour of performance-based compensation. In 
particular, large firms will find that their shareholders have a wide variety of conflicting interest and 
opinion with the managers, eventually lead to higher agency cost. When there is higher agency costs, 
which are expenses incurred in order to maintain the relationship between principals and agents. The 
problem occurred because of the self-interested behaviour. Since the shareholders give power to 
managers to manage the firm’s assets, a potential conflict of interest exist between the two groups. To 
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reduce the agency cost, the ownership should be more insider than the outsider. Hence, to solid the 
power of shareholders, they would not prefer use equity for their capital decision in order to avoid 
dilution of control. There is a positive relationship between insider ownership and capital structure. 
According to Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (1999), agency theory influences the relationship that exists 
between managers and shareholders of firms. In the study, the managerial approach to capital structure 
and the managerial self-interests hypothesis suggest that capital structure decisions are influenced by 
managers’ adverse incentives and the incentive for managers to act opportunistically can be influenced 
by the structure of equity ownership. The increased monitoring by the insider holders increase the 
managerial opportunism and lead to higher agency conflicts. Thus, the firms with large insider 
ownership have significantly lower average of debt ratios. 
Wansley, Collins and Dutta (1996) construct that the principal-agent relationship maintains that an 
increase of insider ownership reduces the agency cost of issuing debt. They suggest that the agency 
costs of debt increase significantly high levels of insider ownership, revealing a nonlinear relation 
attributable to agency costs. Debt financing relevant to agency cost framework because it reduces the 
insiders’ behavioural conflict with outside equity holder. Therefore, higher level of insider ownership 
serves to more closely to align the interest of managers with those of outsiders as the debt rises. In the 
research, they found significant nonlinear relationship between the firm’s debt level and its ownership 
structure. 
The empirical result of Jensen and Meckling (1976) showed that the insider ownership has an 
important impact on managers’ financial decision. They pointed out that the agency cost of debt exists 
as the firm shift to riskier investment after the firm issue debt, and transfer wealth from creditors to 
shareholders to exploit to the option nature of equity. Thus, when there is rising of the management 
ownership, the costs of pursuing a non-value maximizing objective decline. Besides, the optimal 
structure of leverage and ownership maybe used to minimize the agency costs. There are some 
expected correlation between ownership (including managerial ownership) structure and leverage. 
However, this study did not provide a clear relationship between insider ownership and capital 
structure. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
This study’s sample selection criterion is based on secondary data from 652 listed companies on Main 
Board updated as at 31st December 2007 in Bursa Malaysia (KLSE). Firstly, we will exclude the minor 
sector which is less than 30 listed companies in one sector. This is due to the particular sector only 
consisting of few listed companies in Main Board and the sector size is too low, therefore we shall 
exclude it in our studies. Total deduction for the minor sectors is 31 companies which are under Hotels, 
Mining, Technology, REITS, Infrastructure Project Companies (IPC), Closed-end Fund and Exchange 
Trade Fund sectors. 
Thus, this study employs the six industries in Main Board which are Consumer Products, Industrial 
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Products, Construction, Trading and Services, Properties and Plantations. In addition, finance sector 
which consists of 41 companies will be excluded due to the difference in capital structure requirement 
with other companies in Main Board. The nature of the business of finance sector involved accepting 
deposits from depositors and act as lender to provide loans. Therefore, the capital structure of these 
companies is not appropriate to be including in this study because it will affect the veracity of our 
studies finding. 
Second criteria of the sample selection are data employs in our sample size must consist of five years 
data from 2003 to 2007. Subsequently, we found that there are a total of 166 companies with 
incomplete data (less than 5 years annual report or listed background) will totally omit in our sample 
size. 
Besides that, PN4 companies and PN17 companies are excluded in our sample. PN4 companies are 
those will subjected to trade restriction if it failed to comply with the original time frames prescribed 
under paragraph 5.0 of PN4 to regularize its financial condition and thus, they may be subjected to 
suspension from trading. PN17 companies are financially distressed company that require regularizing 
its condition under certain time frame, failing which the stock would be suspended from trading and 
face de-listing procedures. There are 18 of PN4 and PN17 companies excluded in our studies. 
To investigate the matter even more accuracy, we then go on to deduct the companies consist of outlier 
which means their debt-to-equity is far from the average debt-to-equity ratio. In order to determine the 
outlier companies, we use the following equation: 
µ +/- (σ x 3) 
µ = mean, σ = standard deviation 
The mean of debt-to-equity is 0.266 and standard deviation is 0.63037. Hence, companies that have 
debt-to-equity higher than 2.1571 will be consider as outlier companies and there are 15 outlier 
companies shall be exclude in this study. 
In conclude, listed companies eventually will be included in our sample size are a total of 381 
companies. 
 
4. Analysis and Results 
In this chapter, we employed the linear regression model to conduct tests which are pooled regression 
model and cross sectional model. 
From the results, the cross-sectional and pooled analysis results are consistent. Then, we conclude the 
results according to pooled regression model. First, the insider ownership does not affect to the firm 
capital structure. The result shows no relationship between the insider ownership and debt-to-equity 
ratio. Thus, we accept H0 for the Hypotheses I. This result is consistent with Huang and Song (2006) 
and contradicts with the research of Brailsford et al. (1999). 
After we consider the firm size effect, the result shows this variable does influence the relationship 
between insider ownership and capital structure. There is significant relationship and insider ownership 
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is positively correlated with debt-to-equity ratio. In other words, when there is higher insider ownership 
in small firm, it will cause to higher debt-to-equity. Hence, we reject H0 for Hypotheses II. It is 
consistent with the study of Bathala et al. (1994). 
After conduct test to the industry control variable, the results shows the industry in which firms operate 
does influence the relationship between insider ownership and capital structure. It also affects the 
relationship between insider ownership and debt-to-equity ratio become positive correlated. As a result, 
we reject H0 for Hypotheses III. This result is consistent with Brailsford et al. (1999), Huang and Song 
(2006) and Wansley et al. (1996). The conclusion of the findings and recommendations will be 
delineated in the chapter five. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendation 
This research studies the effects of insider ownership on capital structure. Meanwhile, it investigates 
other variables which also influence the relationship between insider ownership and capital structure. 
This section summarizes the research results.  
We used pooled regression model and cross sectional model to measure our outcomes. Generally, the 
pooled regression model showed that insider ownership does not affect the capital structure. After we 
consider the firm size and industry variable, the result show there is positive relationship between the 
insider ownership and capital structure. In other words, the degree of insider ownership would affect 
the financing decision, where the increasing of insider ownership would increase the total 
debt-to-equity in a firm when the firm size and industry variables moderate this relationship. Hence, 
firm size effect does influence the relationship between insider ownership and capital structure. The 
industry variable also does affect the relationship between insider ownership and capital structure. 
A possible explanation can be applied to the insignificant relationship between insider ownership and 
capital structure is the bond market in Malaysian firms is in infant stage, which means not well 
developed. Huang and Song (2006) explained the China firms have low long-term debt ratio because 
the bond market is still in the infant stage of development. Malaysia market is facing the same situation 
as China market that the firms hold a low debt-to-equity ratio. This condition was occurred in 
developing countries. Most of the firms in Malaysia tend to rely on equity financing rather than issuing 
bond that serves as a long term liability to the company. There are fewer companies that issue bonds to 
finance their assets. In order to provide more financing opportunities for Malaysian firms, it is desirable 
for Malaysia to accelerate the development of its bond market. Another possible explanation is the fact 
that the influence of insiders in Malaysian companies is not so significant to affect the financing 
decision of a company. In Malaysia, listed companies are prone to borrow short term debt rather than 
long term debt. It is probably associated to the interest rate that offered by banks for long term 
borrowing is not as attractive as short term borrowing.  
Despite the insignificant relationship, firm size, however, will moderate the relationship to become 
significant. The level of influence of insider ownership on capital structure in a firm varies according to 
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firm size. In this study, the firm size is negatively correlated with the insider ownership and positively 
correlated with debt-to-equity ratio. In Huang and Song (2006) study, they explain this relationship is 
caused by the asymmetric information problem between insiders and outsiders. In order to reduce the 
agency cost, debt financing should be used. Hence, large firms with lower insider ownership prefer to 
have higher debt financing in order to reduce the agency cost. Another reason which can explain the 
relationship by Marsh (1982) is large firms would take advantage of the economies of scale in issuing 
long-term debt. Large firms have higher bargaining power with the creditors and there are able to 
obtain cheaper source of funds. Therefore, larger firms have higher debt-to-equity ratio. This concludes 
that the size of a firm has a very significant influence in the relationship between insider ownership and 
capital structure.  
Another control variable, which is industry factor, does influence the relationship between insider 
ownership and capital structure. According to the studies of Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (1999), Huang 
and Song (2006) and Wansley, Collins and Dutta (1996), the possible explanation to this result is the 
firms in the same industry face similar demand and supply conditions and thus there have similar risk 
characteristic. Leverage ratios vary from different industry. In Wansley, Collins and Dutta (1996), 
Construction sector has the highest level insider ownership as compare to other industry. In this study, 
the findings show the same result which Construction Sector has the highest insider ownership among 
other industries. Thus, different industries would have different insider ownership level and debt level 
due to the different characteristic of the sector. 
In addition, both study in Bathala et al. (1994) and Brailsford et al. (1999) explained that insider 
ownership is positive relationship with debt level due to the personal wealth constraint of corporate 
insiders. In a large firm, managers face difficulty to own larger stake of shares because managers have 
limited borrowing from company. Therefore as the size of the firm grow, it become more costly for 
managers to purchase the shares. As a result, fewer shares are hold by the managers and resulted insider 
control in a large firm become lower. The lower proportion of insider ownership in large firm affects 
shareholders have preference in making equity financing decision. Furthermore, the negative 
relationship of firm size on insider control can be seen through the concentrated and focused operations 
in small firm which give managers greater control over the firm. Thus, higher insider control in small 
firm would issue debt to avoid the dilution of voting right and the power of ownership. In conclude, 
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